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Robert Bray, Introduction to TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, THE GLASS MENAGERIE 97 (1999 energy, arguably the greatest ecosystem service, 7 is unavailable. 8 By balancing generation and load "in real time," the "sophisticated systems" that "ensure continuous delivery of reliable electric service" 9 represent "the ultimate 'just-intime' manufacturing process, where supply must be produced to meet demand in real time."
The law of regulated industries endeavors to lay the foundations of civilization-or at least to finance the most ambitious forms of infrastructure. Through Gilded Age legislation addressing industries "affected with a public interest," 25 the law of regulated industries has built "intricate and pervasive systems which furnish light, heat, power, water, transportation, and communication." 26 For an ambitious society seeking to "catch the last subway, the streetcar, the bus," "[o] ne job is not enough, one life is not enough." 27 As the legal basis of "Infrastructure U.S.A.," public utility law has permitted "a degree of experimentation in governmental direction of economic activity . . . beyond any historical parallel." 28 This Essay explains the obligation to ensure "just and reasonable" regulatory rates as a specialized application of financial economics. Ratemaking represents a legal exercise in capital asset pricing. Part II describes ratemaking as a variant of financial uncertainty. Part III reviews the law governing the rate of return on utility property. Part IV analyzes two valuation methods derived from the Bluefield Water Works decision ("attracting capital" and "comparable earnings"). 29 Part V presents a third approach based on the capital asset pricing model. Part VI concludes that discretionary elements in rate regulation make it 20 .
Lucas W. Davis impossible to wholly alleviate uncertainty in utility pricing. Rate regulation therefore constitutes a speculative undertaking in its own right.
II. Ratemaking as Regulatory Asset Pricing

A. "Public" Utilities, Private Investors
Rate regulation is properly understood as a branch of public finance. The law of regulated industries, like taxation, not only "defray[s] the cost of services" that "the market would not provide in the desired quantity and at the desired price," but also "transfer [s] money" between groups. 30 Differences between "public ownership" and "profit-seeking management" have predictable, systematic "effect[s] . . . . . . on the price behavior of government firms." 31 Public intervention in energy, transportation, and communications markets should be treated as instances of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. 32 Capital structureimplemented through debt, preferred stock, and common stock 33 -is merely a theoretical abstraction that arranges the order of claims against a firm without affecting fundamental valuation. 34 In the United States, most "networks that distribute products or services over geographic space" are owned by private investors and operated for profit. 35 Investor-owned utilities comprise three-quarters of America's trillion-dollar electrical power system. 36 Extensive private ownership converts the term "public utility" into an egregious misnomer. Utilities are "public" in the pragmatic sense that they satisfy mass needs, like "traditional governmental functions of police and justice," and do not become "less so when these services are rendered by private enterprise." 37 From a global perspective, it is "striking that the United States was the only country that was able to maintain private ownership of most of its utilities 30 KNOW 14 (2012) (reporting $765 billion in investor-owned utilities, $200 billion in municipal utilities, and $112 billion in rural electric cooperatives).
37. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 625 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). throughout the twentieth century." 38 Other countries typically commit infrastructure to the public sector. As countries grow, utilities often draw hostile attention as "the first nationally prominent big businesses to emerge" from an industrial revolution. 39 The United States has eluded these political dynamics. True to an "energetic and articulate" culture that champions capitalism over socialism with "remarkable" intensity, 40 America embraces private ownership of infrastructure.
A mostly private electrical power system may struggle to replace climatealtering fuels. As commentators have noted, to "limit[] the anthropogenic increase in global mean surface temperature to less than 2 degrees Celsius," the United States must reduce its greenhouse gas "emissions 80% below 1990 levels by 2050."
41 "[C]urrent wholesale power markets . . . appear limited in their ability to support investments in large, capital-intensive, low-carbon generation facilities such as nuclear or coal plants with carbon capture and storage." 42 The transition "to an 80 percent renewables future will require investing roughly $50-70 billion per year over the next decade," perhaps "between $100 and $200 billion per year as we approach 2050."
43 Low-carbon conversion will demand sums "roughly two to five times larger than current levels of investment in new transmission and generation assets." 44 The "higher capital intensity of a low-carbon electricity system," relative to "the current fossil-based system," compounds the risk inherent in "the longlived nature of many of these assets."
45 Even more than economies of scale 46 Heavy reliance on technological innovation in industries such as broadband communications and the post-carbon electrical system 55 demands a focus on "forward-looking costs" to the exclusion of "historical, booked costs" allegedly stranded by economic, technological, or regulatory change. 56 Whatever their legality, 57 legislative and administrative efforts to recover "stranded" investments are the economic "antithesis of competition." 58 But today's forward-looking investments are tomorrow's sunk costs. 59 The prospect that infrastructure may be stranded by technological or political change affects the marginal propensity to invest. One prime example is the prospect that keeping the anthropocentric contribution to global temperatures below 2°C will "eliminat[e] virtually all natural gas use by 2050." 60 The theory of contestable markets, a description covering vast turf between perfect competition and natural monopoly, 61 recognizes that sunk costs can impede future entry. 62 Because an "investment that cannot easily be moved elsewhere is an impediment to exit," sunk costs pose "a prime obstacle to entry." 63 "Hit-and-run" entry in contestable markets, where investments are not irretrievably committed, imposes competitive discipline and relaxes the need for regulatory intervention. 64 Outside structurally contestable industries such as transportation and mobile telecommunications, 65 however, incumbents defend sunk investments through "sit-and-gun" behavior, including predatory pricing. 66 Sunk costs and contestable markets are ideas drawn from microeconomics and from industrial organization. 67 The principle of "costly reversibility" translates these ideas into corporate finance. Reversals of investment in physical 68 and human 69 capital are never free. "Costly reversibility implies that firms face higher costs in cutting than in expanding capital." 70 The reluctance to build irretrievably sunk infrastructure, to say nothing of private investors' recalcitrance to invest absent reassurance that they will recover their capital, represents a special case of costly reversibility.
The decarbonized future therefore requires not only technological but also legal and financial ingenuity. Investment risk of this magnitude poses financial challenges beyond the conventional regulatory toolkit. 71 Takings cases barring allegedly "confiscatory ratemaking" 72 can do no more than "prevent governmental destruction of existing economic values." 73 The confiscatory ratemaking concept "cannot be applied to insure values, or to restore values that have been lost by the operation of economic forces." 74 Absent some mechanism for "socializ[ing] the costs of . . . investments" in low-carbon generation, "whether through rates, subsidies or some combination," private investors "are unlikely to provide financing on favorable terms." 75 Alarmingly, "liberalized electricity markets" may be incompatible with a low-carbon future. 76 To the extent that governments build or own infrastructure, regulatory pricing principles will also control. Rate regulation governs public and quasipublic enterprises, such as the Postal Service 77 and the Bonneville Power Administration. 78 Publicly owned elements of tomorrow's zero-carbon electrical system will surely be priced "with a view to encouraging the widest possible diversified use of electric power at the lowest possible rates to consumers." 79 Within any system of public finance seeking to spur growth, 80 especially one heeding the "golden rule" that government borrowing should never exceed net capital formation, 81 balancing private and public investment will prove crucial to stabilizing rates of return. 82 The 2016 Supreme Court case of Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC 83 limited states' efforts to promote the construction of generation capacity by promising rates more generous than those available in the federally regulated interstate wholesale market. 84 Hughes cabined states' freedom to "compel[] participants in a federally regulated marketplace to transact capacity at prices other than the price fixed by [that] marketplace." 85 The Court, however, conspicuously withheld judgment on other methods for encouraging "new or clean generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector." 86 Environmental regulation and subsidies would compound the already difficult task of matching prices for electricity to the cost of generation, transmission, and distribution. 87 The balance of Part II will treat the valuation of utility property as a variant of a pervasive financial problem: investment under uncertainty.
B. A Generalized Model of Financial Uncertainty
Information Uncertainty
Prices are signals. They communicate pivotal information about cost, supply, and demand within "the central nervous system of the economy." 88 The discovery and dissemination of economic knowledge inform a collective "wisdom of prices." 89 What is true of prices on utility services is likewise true of the prices of those companies' shares, from individual trades 90 to market-wide demand.
91 Even while invalidating state-level efforts to spur construction of generating capacity, federal courts acknowledge that anticipated electrical sales revenue drive decisions to build (or retire) plants. 92 The valuation of investor-owned utilities therefore demands the proper setting of utility rates. "[C]apital-intensive" utilities historically supported regulation so that they could "secure capital on favorable terms" rather than "rely [ing] . . . on long-term debt financing" to "finance new capital investment" that neither "the equity markets" nor "annual cash flow" would support, at least absent "guaranteed rates and protected franchises." 93 The price at which utilities can secure capital assumes greater importance in an industry that anticipates expensive low-and zero-carbon generation.
Finance is the branch of economics that analyzes the market for capital for speculative undertakings. 94 An efficient capital market rewards the assumption of risk with returns. 95 The expectation that the equity market's excess return over a risk-free asset "should vary positively and proportionately to market volatility" represents the "first law of finance." 96 As the Supreme Court has recognized: "The less risk, the less right to any unusual returns upon [an] Uncertainty affects all economic activity. 103 Economic and political uncertainty suppresses investment. 104 Political uncertainty motivates households to increase precautionary savings. 105 Those savings fuel demand for government bonds and other safe assets. 106 The vulnerability of developing countries to political uncertainty profoundly affects investments in infrastructure, 107 as foreign investors' "fear of regulatory capture and opportunism" by the government reaches its apex. 108 Consumers of public services, especially the most risk-averse, 109 realize "option value" beyond conventional measures whenever uncertainty shrouds future demand. 110 Capital markets fear uncertainty from "ambiguity with respect to the implications of new information for a firm's value." 111 This passage describes two formulas:
1. An economic signal (s) is the sum of value (v) and noise (e): s = v + e 2. The variance of that signal is the sum of the variance of value and the variance of noise. Equivalently, the variance of a signal consists of quantifiable risk plus a premium attributable to the reliability of information used to quantify risk:
Both formulas find ready expression within rate regulation as an applied branch of financial economics. s = v + e describes the utility's value as a function of economic fundamentals, such as anticipated cash flow from utility operations. var(s) = var(v) + var(e) indicates that variance in earnings comprises both fundamental variance and an additional premium reflecting uncertainty.
The reaction of investors to uncertainty deeply affects asset prices. "When agents are unsure of the correct probability laws governing the market return," "they demand a higher premium to hold the market portfolio." 118 The where E designates the expectation operator, re is the excess return of the market over a risk-free asset, V "is the conditional volatility of the market," M "measures the amount of uncertainty in the economy," t indexes all variables (and the expectation operator) over time, and coefficients γ and θ indicate aversion to risk and uncertainty. 120 Notably, this formula implies that "both risk and uncertainty carry a positive premium." Bifurcating s = v + e and var(s) = var(v) + var(e) will prove useful in evaluating economic signals whose underlying variability arises from distinct sources, one of which is less quantifiable and therefore more uncertain. Utilityowned infrastructure is rife with uncertainty. New electrical infrastructure designed to mitigate global climate change illustrates the impact of uncertainty on utility finance. Uncertainty along nearly every dimension-scientific, technological, economic, and political-would raise the cost of capital for any private investment. The ability to express and measure distinct sources of risk and uncertainty, each with its own quantitative traits (including the impossibility of reliable quantification under current data and methods), will prove useful in evaluating the impact of rate regulation on utility valuation and access to capital.
Risk-Neutrality and Irreversibility
A project as ambitious as electrical de-carbonization also illustrates the interaction of uncertainty with asset-specificity and sunk costs. Kenneth Arrow's contributions to the risk-adjusted evaluation of public investments provide a useful starting point. 122 Treating public ownership as the legal default sets a comparably neutral economic baseline. Municipal ownership accounts for onefifth of America's trillion-dollar electrical power industry 123 Because "the risks associated with a public investment are publicly borne, the total cost of risk-bearing is insignificant."
125 Spreading "risk among all taxpayers" renders "negligible" the "costs of risk-bearing." 126 The resulting riskadjusted return may be higher than the private-sector equivalent, 127 more so if risk aversion among shareholders or managers raises a private firm's cost of riskbearing. 128 According to Arrow's 1970 work with Robert Lind, "the government should ignore uncertainty in evaluating public investments." 129 In terms of uncertainty within the variability of an economic signal, var(s) = var(v) + var(e), the public sector's unmatched ability to spread risk reduces risk-bearing cost-and any uncertainty associated with that exercise in risk management-to zero. Variability in the signal collapses to variability in fundamental value: var(s) = var(v). Even more significantly, expected return on public investment becomes the lone measure of value: s = v.
130
Befitting an intellectual era that inspired intertemporal asset pricing 131 and sustainability in resource economics, 132 Arrow did not ignore intergenerational differences in "the revealed preference of individuals. Under such extreme conditions, "standard economic analysis cannot be applied."
141 The "catastrophe-insurance aspect of . . . a fat-tailed unlimited exposure-situation . . . can dominate the social-discounting aspect, the pure-risk aspect, and the consumption-smoothing aspect."
142
Unlike the basic Arrow-Lind theorem, Arrow and Fisher's emphasis on irreversibility assigns maximum value to uncertainty. Within the basic specification of an economic signal's variability, var(s) = var(v) + var(e), these theoretical frames assume that var(e) is much greater than zero. At levels less apocalyptic than those characterizing the dismal theorem (which effectively assumes that var(e) approaches infinity), uncertainty may be modeled as the volatility of certain fundamental measures (such as growth in cash flow or dividends), conditioned on a time-varying measure of aversion. 143 This account of uncertainty connects the environmental economics of irretrievably committed resources with sunk costs in microeconomics, the theory of contestable markets in industrial organization, and costly reversibility in finance. Pairing this narrative with expressions for individual components of economic signals and for variability in those signals provides a generalized framework for evaluating regulatory uncertainty. Especially for industries such as a future zero-carbon electrical system, these insights portend "a relatively high cost of capital" and "very challenging" financial issues for industries facing "large, capital-intensive" investments, "long time horizons" and "uncertainty regarding performance, future prices, and regulations."
152 To ground those potentially grave implications in legal principles, I now discuss the regulatory determination of return on utility assets.
III. Conventional Rate of Return Determinations
A. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking
The task of price regulation at "the heart of public utility regulation" has drawn deep scorn.
153 "The Supreme Power who conceived gravity, supply and demand, and the double helix must have been absorbed elsewhere when public utility regulation was invented." 154 But ratemaking is neither lawless nor incoherent. Although courts today do not bind ratemaking agencies to "any single formula or combination of formulae," 156 stable patterns have emerged. Admittedly, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the statutory "just and reasonable" ratemaking standard has enacted discounted cash flow analysis, the efficient market hypothesis, or capital asset pricing. 157 Those are the terms, however, by which rate regulation has priced utility services and shaped demand for utility stock.
Ratemaking traces its roots to the Supreme Court's 1898 decision in Smyth v. Ames.
158 Smyth is simultaneously celebrated and derided for its declaration that "the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of . . . rates to be charged by a [public utility] must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience of the public."
159 To clarify this baffling formula, the Court offered a list of factors: "the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of [utility] bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property . . . and the sum required to meet operating expenses." 160 Smyth prescribed rates according to "the cost of providing the service" rather than "some other basis," especially "demand for the service." 161 In defending a competing definition of cost as the historic sum of prudent investments, Justice Brandeis restated Smyth as encompassing "not only operating expenses, but also capital changes" covering "interest, for the use of the capital; . . . [ Although all of these variables spark ratemaking disputes, 165 the "cost of common equity is frequently . . . a point of contention."
166 Among the three elements of a regulated firm's cost of capital (long-term debt, preferred stock, and common stock), 167 the rate of return on equity is often most fiercely contested, not least because that factor dictates market capitalization. Return on equity must be "sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise."
168 Focusing on theoretical implications for regulatory economics, Part III now evaluates judicial standards for determining the cost of equity.
Smyth's fair value standard faltered in practice. "In theory the . . . fair value standard mimics the operation of the competitive market," inasmuch as "investments [ Bluefield prescribed not one but two sets of guidelines. The first, the "comparable investment" rule, promised "such rates as will permit" the utility "to earn a return . . . equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding, risks and uncertainties," but not the return "anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures."
182
Bluefield's second approach prescribes rates "reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility" and "adequate . . . to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties."
183 Utilities must earn returns sufficient to "attract capital" and "compensate investors for the risks assumed." 184 Rates that "compensate[] investors" and "attract capital" should cover "operating expenses, debt service, and dividends." 185 Three years before the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue, Learned Hand anticipated the congruence of Bluefield's two standards. "The recurrent appeal to a just rate and a fair value," he wrote, "involves a tacit comparison of the profit under the rate with profits available elsewhere; i.e., under those competitive enterprises which offer an alternative investment." 186 "statement of the comparable-earnings standard" recognized that "attracting capital" requires offsetting the opportunity cost of alternative investments.
187
Judge Hand and Bluefield reflected the modern understanding of opportunity cost as "the cost associated with opportunities that are forgone by not putting [a] firm's resources to their best alternative use."
188 Opportunity cost offsets the behavioral impact of sunk cost. 189 Whereas sunk cost is "usually visible" but "should always be ignored," opportunity cost "is often hidden" but must always "be taken into account." 190 Irrational consideration of sunk costs often prompts conduct based on previous investment. 191 Agents are sometimes "too much invested to quit."
192 Regulatory accounting should not compound such irrationality.
Bluefield's "two conceptions are obviously intertwined." 193 Proper understanding of the regulatory rate of return begins more intuitively with a firmspecific focus on the conditions that would induce investors to bypass other options. Justice Brandeis recognized that a continuous "inflow of [new] capital" into a regulated firm "can only be assured by treatment of capital already invested," so that fairness toward existing investors "will invite and encourage further investment."
194
Bluefield's two standards coexist today alongside a model derived from corporate finance. Parts IV and V will examine all three models. illustrates pitfalls in determining a return sufficient to attract capital. In setting gas pipeline rates under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act, 196 FERC reasoned "that investors are not able to account fully for the effects of a decline in interest rates on their investment alternatives until some six months or more after those rates are published."
Harold Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of Utilities in a Growth
197 That assertion invited withering scrutiny of FERC's discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology.
"DCF analysis" assumes "that the price of a stock is the current value of all expected future cashflows, discounted at the rate of return."
198 DCF assumes that the price of stock equals the present value of a company's dividend stream, projected to grow at a constant rate: Communications Commission adopt an earnings-price model identical to the DCF model in Tennessee Gas. 202 Because the simple ratio of earnings to price allegedly "understate[d] true capital costs by failing to account for investor expectations of future growth," Thatcher proposed "a 'growth factor' determined by the ratio of dividends to the book value of stock adjusted for growth." 203 In his final scholarly work before being appointed to the D.C. Circuit, Harold Leventhal recognized that "it is mathematically sound"-albeit with "simplifying assumptions"-"to express the capital attracting rate for equity as equal to . . . where r is the risk-free rate, P is the stock price, D is the current dividend, g is the expected rate of dividend growth and π is the equity risk premium. 208 The Gordon growth model holds even when interest rates, growth rates, and the risk premium change, 209 provided that "the long-run growth rate, g, is . . . interpreted as a weighted average of expected future growth rates." 210 Holding the equity risk premium to zero and redefining D(1+g) as a forward-looking dividend-D(1+g) = D1-reveals the DCF formula in Tennessee Gas as a special case of the Gordon growth model:
Further simplification may be achieved by holding dividend growth to zero. In that event, the rate of return is simply the ratio of forward-looking dividends to current stock price:
The simple ratio of earnings to stock price "generat[es] that level of earnings necessary to maintain the share price at the attributed rate base per share," where investors will buy utility stock. 212 Among other criticisms of a straightforward calculation of the "going rate of return . . . directly from the market evaluation of . . . utility stock," 213 is the allegation that the earnings-price ratio "is particularly inapplicable to a new venture, whose observed stock price reflects anticipated rather than current earnings. Tennessee Gas represented a stark departure from established principles of discounted cash flow analysis and other dividend growth models. FERC's effort to defend "a 'pragmatic adjustment'" on the basis of an alleged "lag in the decline of dividend yields following [a] decline in interest rates" raised an "intolerable conflict with [DCF] principles." 220 "Everything else being equal, a decline in interest rates means a decline in dividend yields, as stocks and bonds compete for investors' capital." 221 Declining rates drive capital from bonds into stocks, causing the price of utility stock to rise and its yield to drop. 222 Even sources cited by FERC identified utility stocks "as especially close substitutes of bonds" in light of "their (historically) low levels of risk" and similar sensitivity to interest rates. 
Efficient Market Hypothesis
Even more importantly, FERC's handling of interest-rate evidence, especially its "lag theory" of delayed investor reactions to interest-rate changes, constituted "a frontal assault on 'the cornerstone of modern investment theory,' the Efficient Market Hypothesis." 224 The "strong" form of the efficient market hypothesis posits that security prices reflect all information, public and private, and that the prevalence of this knowledge prevents investors from earning excess returns.
225 "[I]n an efficient market, there is no way for most investors to achieve consistently superior rates of return." 226 outcomes suggest that efficient markets, even if not omniscient or frictionless, do eliminate excess returns, at least with respect to individual securities or other small samples. 227 Even less stringent versions of the efficient market hypothesis bode ill for excess returns. 228 The weak version posits that markets assimilate all public information. 229 The semi-strong version assumes immediate diffusion of public information into security prices. 230 Acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis in weak form eliminates excess returns from technical analysis. 231 The semistrong version defeats fundamental analysis. 232 Disproving the presence of serial dependencies in security prices would confirm at least the weak hypothesis. 233 By citing evidence that markets assimilated surprising news regarding the discount rate, money supply, inflation, and real economic activity within one day, Tennessee Gas acknowledged at least the weak form of the hypothesis. 234 The law of regulated industries is likely to follow federal securities law. The "fraud on the market" rule presumes that "the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information and, hence, any material misrepresentations," and that the typical investor who trades at market price relies "on the integrity of that price." 235 In adopting the "fraud on the market" theory, the Supreme Court has "relied upon the 'semi-strong' version" of the efficient market hypothesis. 236 Despite criticism that this presumption rests on unfounded acceptance of efficiency, 237 the Supreme Court has declined to recognize "the kind of fundamental shift in economic theory that could justify overruling" the fraud on the market rule. 238 The Court continues "to presume that most investorsknowing that they have little hope of outperforming the market in the long run based solely on their analysis of public available information-will rely on the security's market price as an unbiased assessment of the security's value in light of all public information." 239 These presumptions collide with more sophisticated understandings of investor heterogeneity and of limits on corrective arbitrage. A market "composed solely of information traders" is a market "where price efficiency and the CAPM hold" and where "[r]isk premia are determined solely by beta and distribution of returns on the market portfolio." 240 But markets host sentiment-driven noise traders as well as fully informed, rational traders. 241 As "noise traders weaken the relation between security returns and beta" and "create a positive conditional correlation between abnormal returns and beta," 242 "steady and forceful" pressure upon "the twin paradigms of price efficiency and the CAPM" compels a "behavioral theory of capital asset prices." 243 The rise of indexes and index-based investing 244 facilitates self-segregation among investors and information-gathering intermediaries. 245 Even sophisticated agents exhibit herding behavior. 246 Delays in the diffusion of information affecting prices imply that some stock groups-including utility stocks as a distinct asset class-"incorporate new information at different rates." 247 Observed delays in the diffusion of information implies that noise trader risk diminishes the corrective potential of arbitrage.
248
B. Comparable Earnings
One final aspect of Tennessee Gas offers insight into the relationship between Bluefield's attracting investment and comparable earnings standards. FERC relied exclusively on interest-sensitive "estimates of . . . This aspect of Tennessee Gas clarifies the relationship between utility stock and the bond markets. The relevant corner of fixed-income markets is not Treasuries, but corporate bonds derided as "junk."
255 High-yield bonds correlate closely to equities and bear similar risks.
256 Low-rated corporate debt with high High-yield bonds, coarsely speaking, are "equity in drag." 258 More elegantly: "A low-grade bond can be viewed as a hybrid security consisting of a government bond and a claim on the issuing firm's equity." 259 Decomposing return on utility stock into bond-like and equity-like components proves critical in explaining the relationship between Bluefield's "attracting investment" and "comparable earning" standards. According to Harold Leventhal's review 260 of Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
261
Consolidated and its regulators had agreed "that the Constitution guaranteed" a "return available without risk, such as return from government obligations."
262
Treasury bonds as risk-free securities set a crucial benchmark in ratemaking and utility valuation. Despite ultimately reversing, the Supreme Court adopted the economic analysis developed at trial. "One who invests his money in a business of a somewhat hazardous character" has "the right to a larger return, without legislative interference, than can be obtained from an investment in government bonds or other perfectly safe security."
263 Beyond this baseline, regulation reduced "investment risk in a gas company . . . almost to a minimum."
264 Equity in Consolidated, thanks to its lawful "monopol[y] [on] the gas service of the largest city in America," represented as "secure [an] earnings and/or share price)." 268 On these assumptions, "the proper rate of return is that which maintains the company's market-book ratio on the same level as 'alternative investment opportunities,'" such as indexes of utility companies.
269
Financial data involving other companies exposed the comparable earnings standard's conceptual weakness. Permian Basin "emphasiz [ed] . . . returns on equity earned by other gas companies" or even by oil producers, whose "revenues . . . were admittedly not regulated." 270 The very presence of rate regulation ensures "that there is no company precisely comparable." 271 Either "the category of comparative firms is so broad that it includes firms in the unregulated sector," or an exclusive focus on "regulated rates . . . in comparativerisk analysis" renders "the test . . . circular." 272 Nevertheless, market pricing of utility stock promises "a built in selfrighting mechanism," insofar as "changing interest rates or capital-scarcity conditions" will lead investors to "demand a greater or lesser return to hold the stock." 273 By displacing a solipsistic, firm-specific focus, comparable earnings approaches forced regulators to evaluate accounting-based assessments such as the prudent investment rule or DCF in light of government bonds yields and equity premiums for regulated and unregulated firms.
Before modern portfolio theory, 274 "finance theory was little more than a collection of anecdotes, rules of thumb, and manipulations of accounting data," 275 The law of regulated industries anticipated two of the "most interesting applications of probability and optimization theory" in finance 276 : the efficient market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Part V now explores the CAPM and its application to rate regulation.
V. The Capital Asset Pricing Model
A. DCF and CAPM as Benchmarks Within a Zone of Reasonableness
Standard regulatory practice often deploys comparable earnings methodologies in tandem with DCF analysis to establish a "zone of reasonableness" for a utility's "rate of return on equity." 277 Consistent with the Gordon growth model, FERC's regulation of oil pipelines uses "a discounted cash flow . . . model" to "project[] investor growth expectations over the long term by adding average dividend yields to estimated constant growth in dividends over the indefinite future." 278 FERC "then assigns the pipeline a rate within" the zone of reasonableness as determined by DCF "to reflect specific investment risks associated with that pipeline," relative "to a proxy group of publicly traded companies."
279
Reference to a proxy group therefore performs the spatial equivalent of using "long-term growth projection[s]" to normalize distortions otherwise arising from exclusive reliance on "short-term data limited to a narrow segment of the economy."
280 Short-term projections, ceteris paribus, are easier and more reliable.
281
But long-term projections hedge against "unanticipated developments" that may undermine shorter forecasts. 282 Checking financial information generated by comparable firms likewise sharpens DCF analyses based on one firm's earnings.
Before 1999, the Florida Public Service Commission supplemented two DCF models applied to a water utility index with two additional comparable earnings benchmarks. 283 First, the PSC employed a "risk premium model applied to an index of publicly traded natural gas utilities" as a proxy for water and wastewater utilities with less ascertainable financial data.
284 Second, the Commission used an asset pricing model based on the market return of dividendpaying stocks, the 30-year Treasury Bonds yield, and the average beta" of the water utility index.
285
In 1999, Florida eliminated historical DCF in favor of "prospective, or forecasted growth rates" based on "the historical trend in dividends." 286 The Commission also eliminated risk adjustments extrapolated from the gas industry, which it deemed "no longer a reasonable proxy." 287 Critically, the Commission recognized that its "CAPM model, because it is a risk premium model, will appropriately reflect the direction of interest rates as previously indicated by the gas risk premium model. 
B. A Formal Description of the CAPM
The CAPM remains the dominant paradigm in financial risk management. 290 The development of "general models represent[ing] equivalent approaches to the problem of capital asset pricing under uncertainty" gave rise to today's CAPM. 291 The capital asset pricing model boasts convenience and "seductive simplicity." 292 The CAPM quantifies the premium for shouldering risk in an asset, over a benchmark represented by the return on a risk-free investment:
where ra, rm, and rf represent returns on the asset, the broader market and a riskfree investment, and where βa represents the individual asset's beta vis-à-vis the market portfolio.
293
Rearrangement yields the following relationship:
The left side of this equation represents the risk premium, 294 the difference between returns on an investment and the risk-free baseline. 295 The risk premium dictates a firm's cost of capital.
C. Beta
Beta provides the simplest measure of undiversifiable risk. 296 It supplies information on volatility and liquidity in the broader marketplace. While measuring co-movement between a single security and the market as a whole, beta does not "assum[e] away the existence of interrelationships among securities," but nevertheless "captures a large part of such interrelationships." 297 Beta of 1 indicates an asset whose sensitivity to risk is the same as the broader market's. 298 Positive values for beta below 1 indicate an asset that moves in the market's direction, but is not as sensitive. 299 Higher beta signals the need for a higher return to attract investment in a presumably riskier company.
300
Beta is a measure of systematic covariance: 301 Beta reports the relationship between returns on a single asset and returns on the tradable universe.
302 Beta as correlated relative relativity is the product of (1) the ratio of asset-specific volatility to market-wide volatility and (2) the correlation between asset-specific and market-wide returns: 303 These elaborations of the CAPM make it easy to understand ratemaking as asset pricing. Specifically designating an index of water utilities as the target asset class yields a pricing model for water and wastewater utilities: 
The capital asset pricing model suffers from many weaknesses. Most critically, beta is not positively related to returns on stock. 305 Returns are skewed 306 and exhibit heavier than normal tails. 307 Many risks follow abnormal, non-Gaussian distributions. 308 Large swings of 3σ to 6σ occur so often that "[e]xtreme price swings are the norm in financial markets-not aberrations." 309 The maximum price change in the American stock market from 1871 to 2010 was "a 'ten-sigma event,'" whose probability under "a normal distribution" would be "less than once in the life of the universe." 310 But attacks on "standard deviation and its variations" as measures of risk in "non-normal distributions" have failed to dislodge beta, 311 if only because "relatively little effort has been made" to devise "a better risk measure." 312 Beta's leading nemesis has conceded that "market professionals (and academics) still think about risk in terms of market β."
313 Even models purporting to deprecate beta as "insignificant" continue to treat beta as "an important explanatory variable," despite refusing to treat beta as "the main explanatory variable." 314 The CAPM thrives despite academic attacks. "It takes a better theory to kill an existing theory," and finance has "yet to see [a] better theory." 315 Empirical support for other asset-pricing models is not better and "the economic importance of the empirical evidence against the CAPM . . . is ambiguous. 316 Courts continue to think of risk and asset pricing in terms of the CAPM. 317 The "concept of beta risk" represents "the single most important contribution of academic researchers" to finance. 325 have assumed that 'just and reasonable' rates could conclusively be determined by reference to market price." 336 The obligation to articulate some defensible basis for a rate finds parallels throughout the law of regulated industries. The power to "modify any requirement" of title II of the Communications Act 337 did not include the requirement that carriers file tariffs, 338 lest "a fundamental revision" create " a scheme of rate regulation only where competition does not exist." 339 To like effect is the admonition that a presumption of competition does not constitute regulation of entry in the public interest. "Merely to assume that competition is bound to be of an advantage, in an industry so regulated and so largely closed . . . is not enough." 340 Even broader legal consilience connects regulatory valuation to taxation. Bluefield's two methods (comparable earnings and attracting investment) and Justice Brandeis's prudent investment rule precisely parallel the three recognized methods for valuing real estate in ad valorem taxation. 341 Property taxation reveals the superiority of Bluefield's standards over prudent investment. " [O] rdinarily the market data approach, guided . . . by actual buyers and sellers of comparable property in the market, is the best guide to market value." 342 The "market price" from "a recent, voluntary, arm's length transaction" between "knowledgeable and willing" parties supplies "very persuasive" if "not conclusive" evidence of value. 343 The "income approach is the most effective approach in determining the value of investment properties," especially "large office buildings." 344 "Finally . . . the cost approach is the least reflective of market value and is used only as a check of the estimates obtained from the other approaches." 345 At least in taxation, exactly three methodologies-comparable earnings, discounted cash flow, and accounting-appear to exhaust the universe of feasible approaches to valuation. All three approaches persist even as the valuation of real property and ecosystem services incorporates large datasets of economic and geographic information. 346 The question is whether valuation methodologies in Thoughtful comparison of all ratemaking methods-prudent investment, DCF, comparable earnings, and the CAPM-reveals critical differences along two dimensions. One dimension is temporal, running from the determinate (if imperfectly recorded or reported) past to an intrinsically uncertain future. Among standards for determining a utility's rate of return, the prudent investment standard alone connects future return to past expenditures. The Gordon growth model demonstrates how DCF analysis can be conducted on the basis of past dividends. But Bluefield's directive that regulators set return so as to "attract investment" spins the temporal arrow toward the future. As securities law warns, past performance is no guarantor of future performance, and future rather than past cash flow dictates stock prices.
The other dimension is economically spatial. The spatial boundary among rate-of-return methodologies falls along a different divide. The prudent investment and DCF methodologies are firm-specific insofar as they rely on economic performance unique to the regulated firm. The value of the comparable earnings standard lies in its directive that regulators look beyond the firm. Industry-wide information, so pivotal in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 357 represented a logical step toward the consideration of firm-specific, industryspecific, and market-wide information in ratemaking methodologies based on the CAPM.
Temporal and spatial differences in ratemaking methodologies will profoundly affect the pricing of future utility infrastructure under uncertainty. At this stage in the development of low-and zero-carbon electrical generation, regulators have a very limited set of antecedents. If regulation, like economics itself, is a system for conveying information through prices, then retrospective and firm-specific methodologies offer an initial but ultimately illusory advantage. Prudent investment or DCF analysis based on historical dividend information is almost surely more readily discovered, and with greater confidence, than inquiries into the regulated industry, capital markets, or macroeconomic conditions. Trouble arises, however, upon the realization that all sources of uncertainty related to low-or zero-carbon electrical infrastructure-changes in climate, energy technologies, the nature of demand for electricity, and the law itself-are forward-looking. Only by striking a prospective perspective and expanding inquiry past firm-specific factors can regulators accurately forecast demand for electricity, its cost drivers, and the willingness of investors to shoulder complex sources of risk. Regulators have no choice but to climb the conceptual progression from forward-looking DCF analysis (using sophisticated variants of the Gordon growth model) to industry-wide or market-wide methodologies exploiting comparable earnings and CAPM data.
The bias against retrospective, firm-specific methodologies and in favor of prospective, spatially broader methodologies arose during Hope Natural Gas, 357 . 390 U.S. 747 (1968) . the decision rightfully regarded as the genesis of contemporary regulation. Justice Robert Jackson, lauded for "analyz[ing] with particularity the economic and social aspects of natural gas as well as the difficulties which led to the enactment of the Natural Gas Act," 358 warned against unthinking endorsement of prudent investment methodology. Although "prudent investment" may boast "relative merits for a utility which creates its service merely by its investment," that theory "has no rational application where there is no such relation between investment and capacity to serve." 359 Justice Jackson's criticism supplies a standing admonition against backward-looking regulatory pricing. In forecasting demand for a utility service and the price at which investors will support entry, as with all forward-looking judgments, "there is little more relation between [past] investment and the results than in a game of poker." In an metaphor befitting the tumultuous Anthropocene epoch, the law of regulated industries must now confront its own no-analog future. 362 All legal doctrines, from fair value in Smyth to the CAPM, remain extant. But environmental, economic, and technological conditions have reshuffled legal principles to such an extent that regulators must manage new circumstances with old tools, but no historical guidance.
Finer points of mathematical finance and constitutional doctrine ultimately yield to practical considerations. "It is not theory . . . which counts," after all, "but the impact of the rate order." 363 Administrative consistency matters as much as intellectual cogency.
364 "An important factor in the cost of capital . . . is investor uncertainty regarding future company or regulatory action that affects the components of total return on equity." 365 Because liberalized electricity markets are prone to "some periods of high prices and greater differentiation between the prices paid by industrial customers . . . and [by] residential customers," this industry faces an elevated risk of political intervention. 366 Unless capital markets have a clear understanding of regulatory "methods to be employed in calculating total return, this uncertainty becomes an additional risk" factor that will "increase[e] the minimal return that [an investor] demands." 367 Although changes in the physical environment and the arc of technological progress may lie beyond the law, minimizing regulatory uncertainty benefits consumers and the allocation of resources generally. 368 Legal consistency should bar either firms or their regulators from shifting arbitrarily between ratemaking methodologies.
369 Such "an exciting new twist" in regulation "invites an enormous amount of gamesmanship." 370 Wholly apart from private firms' motivation to exploit ratemaking rules, regulators face their own behavioral temptation. The asymmetry of regulatory risk may lure agencies into "arbitrarily switch [ing] back and forth between methodologies in a way which require [s] investors to bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them the benefit of good investments at others." 371 Tautologies such as = ⁄ + , however, do serve useful purposes. What matters is that the tautology be "correct."
374 "All models are wrong; some models are useful." 375 DCF and the Gordon growth model epitomize the quest for a rate of return that attracts investment. The CAPM culminates nearly a century of regulatory wisdom garnered while "muddling through" the comparable earnings standard. 376 Both of Bluefield's ratemaking standards 377 may be understood in terms of section II.B.1's general model of financial uncertainty.
DCF, the Gordon growth model, and the CAPM are all special cases of the formula, s = v + e, which denotes an economic signal (s) as the sum of fundamental value (v) and noise (e). The basic DCF formula, , defines the rate of return as the ratio of dividends to share price, plus a less determinate growth factor. Rejecting the unrealistic assumption that investors "live for only one period" connects DCF and the Gordon growth model with more sophisticated models. 378 Investment-based asset pricing defines the rate of return as a function of corporate earnings and stock returns. 379 Conceptually, the rate of return should equal the ratio of a vector of future earnings from which a corporation pays dividends to the corresponding vector of capital investments:
This ratio amalgamates prudent investment with the basic ratio of earnings to price.
The regulatory CAPM, ) = % + ) ( ) − % ), likewise fits the basic s = v + e formula. The second half of this formula, ) -) − % . may be
